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GROH V. RAMIREZ, THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT,
AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Old debates on the Fourth Amendment' and qualified immunity2
were recently rekindled in the Supreme Court opinion Groh v. Rami-
rez.3 In a case involving a federal agent drafting a constitutionally in-. 4
firm warrant that was signed by a magistrate, the Justices lined up to
reaffirm the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, seven-to-
two, 5 and limit cualified immunity for mistakes in preparing a war-
rant, five-to-four. In doing so, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit
and limited an agent's qualified immunity solely because of his mis-
take in preparing a warrant. This decision serves as the Court's latest
pronouncement on official immunity," further delineating what is
I SeeJamesJ. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the Warrant Requirement,
29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1992) ("Through the years, the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement has ridden something of a legal roller coaster. It has risen to become a venerated
principle of constitutional law, then fallen to the status of insupportable creation of overactive
jurists, only to rise again to an exalted Fourth Amendment position." (footnote omitted)).
2 See Charles R. Wilson, "Location, Location, Location": Recent Developments in the Qualified Im-
munity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 473 (2000) ("The debate over the appropriate
level of specificity with which to define 'clearly established' reflects the tension between com-
peting values inherent in any application of the law of qualified immunity."). See generally Tho-
mas E. O'Brien, Note, The Paradox of Qualified Immunity: How a Mechanical Application of the Ob-
jective Legal Reasonableness Test Can Undermine the Goal of Qualified Immunity, 82 TEx. L. REV. 767,
767 (2004) ("The primary purpose of qualified immunity is to shield government officials from
'undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.'" (citing
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982))).
3 124 S. Ct. 1284 (2004).
4 Id. at 1288 (majority opinion).
5 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kennedy found a constitutional violation due to the lack of a valid warrant. See id. at 1289-93
(majority opinion) ("The Court of Appeals correctly held that the search was unconstitu-
tional."); id. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("I agree with the Court that the Fourth Amend-
ment was violated in this case."). Justices Thomas and Scalia wanted to engage in a conversa-
tion "in order to determine the relationship between the Warrant Clause and the
Unreasonableness Clause," id. at 1299 (Thomas, J., dissenting), and "[b]ecause the search was
not unreasonable, [they] would conclude that it was constitutional," id. at 1301.
6 The majority, whose opinion was crafted by Justice Stevens and included Justices
O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, felt qualified immunity was not appropriate, id. at
1293-94 (majority opinion), while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and
Scalia would extend qualified immunity to the agent, id. at 1295-98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
id. at 1301-03 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
7 See Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying qualified
immunity to Agent Groh).
8 The qualified immunity doctrine has been constantly evolving through Supreme Court
opinions. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999);
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Butz v. Econumou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); see also infra
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expected of an agent in order to receive qualified immunity, while at
the same time refusing to followJustices Thomas and Scalia down the
path to overruling Katz's warrant requirement.9 In the end, Groh's
legacy may be a narrowing of the mistake justification for qualified
immunity. However, in solidifying the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement, the Court also left open the possibility for a general re-
quirement that officers show search warrants to their subjects upon
request.
I
Joseph Ramirez lived on a "large ranch in Butte-Silver County,
Montana" with his family.'0 In February 1997, Jeff Groh, an experi-
enced Special Agent in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire-
arms ("ATF"), received a tip that Mr. Ramirez kept a "large stock of
weaponry" 2 on his ranch in violation of federal statute. The source
of the tip had personally observed the stockpile on visits to Mr. Rami-
rez's ranch. 4 Wanting to search the property, Aent Groh prepared
three documents for presentation to a magistrate. 5 These documents
16included a sealed search warrant application, a sealed "detailed affi-
davit' ' 7 to support the application, and a search warrant awaiting a
magistrate's signature. The warrant application "particularly de-
scribed the place to be searched and the contraband [Agent Groh]
expected to find,"'9 and was supported by Groh's executed affidavit,
which also itemized the subjects of Groh's search.20 However, the
warrant was not as specific.
notes 69-72 and accompanying text (explaining how these cases shaped the qualified immunity
doctrine).
9 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that a warrant was a "constitu-
tional precondition").
Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1287 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1287-88 (notingJeffGroh had been a special agent with the ATF since 1989).
12 Id. at 1288. The stockpile included "an automatic rifle, grenades, a grenade launcher,
and a rocket launcher." Id.
13 Id. at 1288 n.1 ("Possession of these items, if unregistered, would violate 18 U.S.C. §
922(o) (1) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861.").
14 Id. at 1288.
15 Id.
16 See id. (noting the application had been sealed).
17 Id. at 1288 & n.3.
18 Id. at 1288.
19 Id.
20 See id. ("Petitioner supported the application with a detailed affidavit, which he also pre-




The pre-prepared warrant was submitted to the magistrate along
with the two other supporting documents.2' The significance of
Agent Groh filling out the warrant himself was not lost on the Court,
as the majority later points to his authorship as a factor in denying
qualified immunity. 2 The warrant "failed to identify any of the items
that [Agent Groh] intended to seize, 23 and instead listed the entire
ranch house as the place to be seized.2 ' Although the warrant did in-
dicate that the Magistrate found probable cause on the basis of the
affidavit, the warrant application and affidavit were not incorporated
into the warrant.2 5 Groh and a team of officers served the warrant the
day after the Magistrate signed it.26 The search failed to turn up any
illegal weapons and no charges were brought against the Ramirezes.
Agent Groh left a copy of the search warrant with Mrs. Ramirez as he
and his team were leaving the property.28 Because the warrant appli-
cation was sealed, a copy of the application was not left with Mrs. Ra-
29mirez.
21 Id.
22 See id. at 1293 ("[B]ecause petitioner himself prepared the invalid warrant, he may not
argue that he reasonably relied on the Magistrate's assurance that the warrant contained an
adequate description of the things to be seized and was therefore valid.").
23 Id. at 1288.
24 See id. ("In the portion of the form that called for a description of the 'person or property'
to be seized, [Agent Groh] typed a description of respondents' two-story blue house rather than
the alleged stockpile of firearms." (footnote omitted)).
25 Id. Incorporating the application into the warrant would make the list of things to be
seized part of the warrant, but the magistrate's finding of probable cause gives no additional
specifics about the subject of the search to a third party reading the warrant.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. There was some debate about whether Agent Groh orally told Mrs. Ramirez the specif-
ics regarding the subjects of his search. See id. (explaining that while Agent Groh claims to have
"orally described the objects of the search," Mrs. Ramirez claims he only said he was looking for
"an explosive device in a box"). However, the Court placed no emphasis on this debate since
the case reached the Court on Agent Groh's motion for summaryjudgment and, therefore, the
Court had to accept Mrs. Ramirez's account of disputed evidence. Id. at 1293 (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Given the Court's concentration on the war-
rant's deficiency, it is doubtful that Groh's oral clarification would carry any weight, even if the
Court were to accept his version.
29 Id. at 1288. The page of the warrant application listing the items to be seized was faxed to
the Ramirez's attorney the following day upon the attorney's request. Id.
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S 30The Ramirezes brought a Bivens action, along with federal statu-
tory claims,31 against Agent Groh and his fellow officers claiming,
among other things, a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.3
2
The district court granted summary judgment for Agent Groh and all
of his fellow officers.33 The court analogized this case to others where
the warrant simply contained an improper address, and found no
constitutional violation. In dicta explaining that even if there were a
constitutional violation, qualified immunity would be given to the of-
ficers, the court again characterized Agent Groh's conduct as a "ty-
pographical error" that a reasonable officer could make.35
On appeal, placing an emphasis on Groh's position as team
leader, the Ninth Circuit left the district court opinion largely undis-
turbed, but allowed the Fourth Amendment claim to proceed against
Agent Groh, and only Groh.5 The court found a constitutional viola-
tion because the warrant was not particular enough.3 ' The judges
reasoned that, "the absence of a sufficiently particular warrant in-
creased the likelihood and degree of confrontation between the
Ramirezes and the police"38 and "the invalid warrant deprived the
Ramirezes of the means to be on the lookout and to challenge
30 A Bivens action, named for the case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is a cause of action whose right to a remedy is found in the Con-
stitution itself--specifically the Fourth Amendment in that case. In the absence of legislation,
the Court fashions a remedy for such a violation as it does at times with federal statutes lacking
a remedy. Id. at 402 (Harlan,J., concurring) (citingJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964);
Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944)). Bivens ac-
tions have an extremely low success rate. See Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An
Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. REv. 337, 343 (1989) ("Of the some 12,000 Bivens suits filed [from
1971-1989], only thirty have resulted in judgments on behalf of plaintiffs." (footnote omitted)).
Furthermore, over time the Court has narrowed Bivens actions "to a few narrowly defined cir-
cumstances." Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183,
197-98 (2003). Therefore, the fact that a Bivens action was even sustained in this case is worth
noting.
31 Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1288 (majority opinion).
32 Id. at 1288-89.
33 Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, No. CV 99-17-BU-DWM, 1999 WL 33649117, at *6 (D.
Mont. Oct. 20, 1999). More specifically, the court granted the agents' motion to dismiss and
ordered an entry of a judgment in their favor. Id.
34 See id. at *5 (noting that there are only violations in such cases "if the premises is not suffi-
ciently described to enable officers to locate the correct address or if there is a reasonable
probability that the officers will search the wrong house"). The Ramirezes made a tongue-in-
cheek, but nonetheless poignant, argument that if the agents were looking for a "two-story blue
house," as the warrant listed, they surely would not find one opening cupboards and drawers.
Id. at *4. This point emphasizes how poorly the warrant was drafted prima facie and how little
guidance it gave to someone observing the search.
35 Id. at *5.
36 The remaining officers were entitled to qualified immunity on account of the fact that
"[I] ine officers.., are required to do much less." Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d
1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2002).
37 Id. at 1026.
38 Id. at 1027.
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officers who might have exceeded the limits imposed by the magis-
trate."39 The court withheld qualified immunity from Groh because
"[t] he officers who lead the team that executes a warrant are respon-
sible for ensuring that they have lawful authority for their actions.
In this case, a simple review of the warrant he prepared would have
made clear to Groh that the warrant, which listed the dwelling as the
thing to be seized, had a problem. 41 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari on the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity questions
as they pertained to Agent Groh.42
II
Seven Justices found a constitutional violation simply on a
straightforward reading of the amendment.43  The Fourth Amend-
ment requires that warrants "particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."44 As Justice Ken-
nedy explains, using basic logical reasoning, "The warrant issued in
this case did not particularly describe the thinss to be seized, and so
did not comply with the Fourth Amendment."' In fact, the majority
states that the warrant "failed altogether" to meet this requirement. 6
The warrant's supporting documents included an itemized list, but
that list was not incorporated into the warrant automatically.
47
Rather, the officer must explicitly incoTorate and attach the docu-
ments, if he chooses to use this method. Neither condition was met




41 See id. at 1028 (taking notice that Groh admitted "he did not read the warrant after the
magistrate issued it and before he began the search").
See Groh v. Ramirez, 537 U.S. 1231 (2003) (mem.) (granting certiorari); see also Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at *i, Groh v.
Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284 (2004) (No. 02-811), available at 2002 WL 32101201.
43 See Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1289 (2004) (majority opinion) (finding a plain vio-
lation of the language of the amendment); id. at 1295 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (same).
4U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
46 Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 1289 (majority opinion).
See id. ("The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in
the supporting documents.").
The Court recognizes that many circuits have allowed incorporation of other documents
into the warrant "if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting
document accompanies the warrant." Id. at 1290 (citing United States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847,
849-50 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Williamson, 1 F.3d 1134, 1136 n.1 (10th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1025-26 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Maxwell, 920
F.2d 1028, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Curry, 911 F.2d 72, 76-77 (8th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1980)).
49 The reference to the sealed affidavit in this case was not a cross-reference, but rather a
statement of satisfaction by the magistrate. The fact that the affidavit was sealed means it could
May 2004)
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The reasons behind the particularity requirement were debated at
oral argument and could shed some light onto why there was a
Fourth Amendment violation in this case. A warrant serves more
than one purpose. 1 The Ninth Circuit had given the following three
reasons for the particularity requirement: (1) to decrease disagree-
ments between the officers and search targets; (2) to give the search
targets the ability to be on the "lookout" for police conduct that runs
astray of the warrant; and (3) to exclude oral enlargements by police
officers of the realm of the search . Rather than adopting these rea-
sons, the Court points to previous cases explaining the reasons be-
hind the particularity requirement. The Court says the particularity
requirement's rationale is broader than simply preventing "general
searches, 53 and includes the purpose of legitimizing the officer's
conduct, authority, and scope of search. The Court does not go as
far as the circuit court and place an emphasis on the possibility of an
individual right to monitor the search because the Fourth Amend-
ment does not require the warrant to be served before the search.55
Yet one wonders if the only way to legitimize the search is to prohibit
officers from playing a game of keep-away with the warrant-in most
circumstances.
Pairing the reasoning behind Fourth Amendment particularity
and reasonableness could lead to a requirement that, upon request, a
warrant be shown to the subject of a search before commencement of
the search. Even conceding that the Ninth Circuit was wrong and
there is no individual right to review the warrant, if one assumes no
exigency or other exceptions (like a covert wire-tap search), would it
not be meaningfully attached to the warrant. See David Horan, Breaking the Seal on White-Collar
Criminal Search Warrant Materials, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 317, 323-25 (2001) ("With a sealing or-
der.., the government denies the target access to these materials even after the agents com-
plete the search."). Yet, the affidavit's sealing is not a viable excuse for the warrant's deficiency.
Any reasonable officer must realize that if the warrant does not have any particulars and the
incorporated documents are sealed (the affidavit was not incorporated in this case either), then
the warrant must be more specific. The sealing of the affidavit is a barrier put up by the gov-
ernment. Surely, it cannot use its own barrier as a reason not to be specific. Additionally, list-
ing the items to be seized in the warrant would not compromise the rest of the information in
the affidavit.
50 See Oral Argument Transcript at 8-11, 23-30, 35-41, Groh (No. 02-811) [hereinafter
Transcript] (discussing reasons behind, and possible implications of, the particularity require-
ment), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supremecourt/docket/2003/
november.html#02-8 11.
51 See Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1292 (majority opinion) ("We have long held, moreover, that the
purpose of the particularity requirement is not limited to the prevention of general searches.").
52 Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2002).
53 Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1292 (majority opinion) (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84
(1987)).
Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)). As drafted, there was no way
the warrant in this case would satisfy these purposes.
55 Id. at 1292 n.5.
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be reasonable to deny the target of a search access to the search war-
rant? This hypothetical was pushed during oral arguments,56 al-
though it was not a central issue to this case. Per the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, an officer must leave a copy of the warrant after
finishing the search and taking property.57 Furthermore, in footnote
five, the Court recognizes that there is no requirement in the rules or
Fourth Amendment to show a warrant before commencing the
search.58 Therefore, it is significant that notwithstanding the recogni-
tion, the Court still leaves open the possibility that an officer may
need to provide a particular warrant before beginning a search if the
person answering the door requests to see a search warrant-and
there are no exigencies-for the search to be considered reason-
able.5 In such a case, the warrant shown must be particular in order
to give some guidance towards "assur[ing] ... the lawful authority of
the executing officer."60
Throughout this debate, Justices Thomas and Scalia want to move
away from a warrant requirement in hopes of a return to "reason-
ableness. They find no constitutional violation even though they
Mr. Schlick, an attorney representing the United States as amicus curie supporting Agent
Groh pushed the hypothetical:
QUESTION: ... [T] here's a knock on the door and the policeman says, I have a
warrant. And I say, may I see it? He says, well, oh no, you can't see it until I leave. Is
that-is that your position?
MR. SCHLICK No, again that would be analyzed under the law of knock and an-
nounce, and it may be reasonable under the circumstances-
QUESTION: If they have a warrant, do I have a right to read the warrant?
MR. SCHLICK If-if the homeowner denied entry until a copy of the warrant is
provided, the officer would be faced with the question, is this a constructive denial of en-
try? Is there some exigency for getting into the property? And it may be reasonable un-
der the circumstances-
QUESTION: No, there-no, there-there's no exigency because there's only one
person there and he's at the door and that person says, I'd like to read this warrant.
Does he have the right to do that before officer enters?
MR. SCHLICK If there were no exigencies, then ordinarily the reasonableness
principle probably would require that, but the purpose of the particularity requirement,
it's very clear, is to ensure that the search is conducted in accordance with what the mag-
istrate authorized.
QUESTION: Why isn't that in our rule if-if you're willing to concede that that's a
constitutional requirement?
Transcript, supra note 50, at 24-25.57 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (f) (3) (requiring officers seizing property to leave a copy of the war-
ran9'Grh,' 124 S. Ct. at 1292 n.5 (majority opinion).
See id. (leaving open the question of the reasonableness of a refusal to show a warrant
where "an occupant of the premises is present and poses no threat to the officers' safe and ef-
fective performance of their mission.").
60 Id. at 1292 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)).
61 Id. at 1298 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he text of the Fourth Amendment certainly does
not mandate" a warrant requirement.). This is not a new position for Justice Scalia, who has
been arguing for a return to reasonableness for some time. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500
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concede the warrant in this case was "defective."" While the Court
has held warrantless searches presumptively unreasonable, s the dis-
sent points to the various exceptions to the presumptive unreason-
ableness of a warrantless search as an indication of the imprecision
and shortcomings of the rule.6 The dissent sarcastically notes,
"[O]ur cases stand for the illuminating proposition that warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable, except, of course, when they are
not."65 Justice Thomas then argues that this search was reasonable
because all of the officers in the team were given copies of the sealed
application and affidavit, they went over them orally, and the search
was performed within the parameters the magistrate approved.
Even assuming, arguendo, a disjunction between the Reasonable-
ness and Warrant Clauses of the Fourth Amendment, there could still
be a violation in this case. Is it reasonable to conduct a search pursu-
ant to a warrant that lacks one of the requirements specifically spelled
out in the Fourth Amendment? It must be that the warrant meets
constitutional criteria, at a minimum, to be considered reasonable. If
an officer wants to conduct a search under the guise of a warrant, and
all the legal-sounding gravitas it conjures up in the citizenry, it can
only be expected that the warrant the officer claims to be using is a
legitimate one for the search to be deemed reasonable. However,
this debate is purely academic at this point because seven members of
the Court found a constitutional violation simply on the breach of
the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms
require a prior warrant for searches and seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that
are 'unreasonable.'"). The case Justice Thomas cites as an example of the Court having at one
time adopted the reasonableness only approach is United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950)-a case that has since been overruled. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1298 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
62 Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1299 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("despite the defective warrant").
63 See id. at 1298 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
Id. at 1298-99. The exceptions Justice Thomas notes include: "searches incident to ar-
rest" from Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); "automobile searches" from United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982); "searches of 'pervasively regulated' businesses" from
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-17 (1972); "administrative searches" from Camara v.
Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967); "exigent circum-
stances" from Warden, Maryland Penitentiay v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967); "mobile home
searches" from Calfornia v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-94 (1985); "inventory searches" from Illi-
nois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983); and "border searches" from Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973). Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1298-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65 Croh, 124 S. Ct. at 1299 (Thomas, J., dissenting).




Finding a facial violation of the Fourth Amendment by Agent
Groh, the question remains whether or not he is entitled to qualified
immunity from Civil suit.6 7  Here there was a less decisive majority,
five-to-four, to withhold qualified immunity.6 Qualified immunity,
given to most executive officials rather than absolute immunity," is an
immunity that depends on whether the officer violated a "clearly es-
tablished" right.70 The standard is "whether it would be clear to a rea-
sonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he con-
fronted. '71  The inference is that if an officer makes a reasonable
mistake, he is entitled to qualified immunity even though his actions
were illegal.72  Because the mistake so clearly violated the Fourth
Amendment in this case, the Court holds no reasonable officer could
claim the warrant met Fourth Amendment requirements. It is upon
this point that Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist differ
from the majority.
Justice Kennedy, in dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
characterizes the mistake as a mere "clerical error. 74 Indeed, in the
dissent's view it was such a minor error, that no one picked it up
67 Id. at 1293 (majority opinion) (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999)). See gen-
erally Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the Totality of Circum-
stances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally Disturbed People, 34 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REv. 261, 270 (2003) ("Under this [qualified immunity] defense, a public official
is entitled to qualified immunity from liability for a civil rights violation where a reasonable offi-
cial would not have known that his specific conduct in the case in question violated a clearly
established constitutional right of the plaintiff." (footnote omitted)).
68 See supra note 6 (discussing how the Justices aligned in deciding the qualified immunity
issue).
69 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (holding that "in a suit for damages aris-
ing from unconstitutional action, federal executive officials exercising discretion are entitled
only to the qualified immunity").
70 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), moved towards a completely objective determina-
tion. More recently Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), explained, "For a constitutional right to
be clearly established, its contours 'must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" Id. at 739 (citing Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
71 Groh, 124 S. Ct. 1293 (majority opinion) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).
72 See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205 ("An officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts
but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal in those
circumstances. If the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the
officer is entitled to the immunity defense.").
73 See Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1293 (majority opinion) ("Given that the particularity requirement
is set forth in the text of the Constitution, no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant
that plainly did not comply with that requirement was valid." (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-
19)).
74 Id. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Agent Groh correctly noted the thing to be seized in
two of the three documents. "When he typed up the description a third time for the proposed
warrant, however, the officer accidentally entered a description of the place to be searched in
the part of the warrant form that called for a description of the property to be seized." Id.
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along the process-not Groh, the magistrate, nor any of the other of-
ficers.75 Groh even explained and executed the search warrant as if
there had not been the clerical error.16 Justice Kennedy's view is if an
agent fulfills the "number of serious responsibilities" a supervising77 7
agent has, he should "be excused" for a mere scrivener's error.' He
notes that we all make mistakes that we miss in the "myopia when
looking for our own errors, '79 and there needs to be "some latitude
for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and
difficult process of making arrests and executing search warrants." °
In his opinion, the Court's view "requires our Nation's police officers
to concentrate more on the correctness of paper forms than substan-
tive rights.,
81
The majority's retort to Justice Kennedy is two-fold." On one
hand, the case Justice Kennedy cites calls for latitude in "making ar-
rests and executing search warrants,83 not simply drafting warrants.
Clearly, the same exigency does not apply to drafting a warrant as
serving one.84 The Court then points to the "constitutional magni-
tude" of the violation in this case to focus the issue on the right that is
being violated rather than the fact that the right was violated by in-
85correct papers. According to Justice Kennedy, "the essential ques-
tion here is whether a reasonable officer in petitioner's position
would necessarily know that the warrant had a clerical error in the
first place.8 s6 This fails to recognize that Groh created the error him-
self in drafting the warrant, and jumps straight to Groh's review of
the warrant. While checking a warrant is passive action, drafting one
is taking decisive affirmative action. The actual question is whether
an agent would necessarily know how to, and make sure that he did,
75 Id. at 1295-96.
76 Id. at 1296.
77 Id. Justice Kennedy points to the "difficult and important" duties to "establish probable
cause," "articulate specific items that can be seized, and a specific place to be searched," "obtain
the search warrant from a magistrate judge," "instruct a search team," and "oversee the execu-
tion of the warrant." Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. Justice Kennedy points out that "[e]very lawyer and every judge can recite examples of
documents that they wrote, checked, and double-checked, but that still contained glaring er-
rors." Id. He can add to that list student authors who wrote, checked, and double-checked
pieces that may still contain Bluebook errors. See generally THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000).
80 Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S.
79, 87 (1987)).
81 Id. at 1298.
82 See id. at 1294 n.9 (majority opinion) (responding to the opinion of Justice Kennedy).
83 Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87.
84 See Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1294 n.9 (majority opinion) (taking note of the difference. between
drafting and serving a warrant).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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fill out the warrant correctly. When the stakes are as high as they are,
such obvious mistakes cannot be made. Justice Kennedy's point
about lawyers and judges making clerical mistakes is well taken;
8 7
however, in some circumstances, such as drafting contract language
or filling out an order form, "clerical mistakes" have consequences.
Similarly, a "clerical mistake" that creates a constitutional violation
must have consequences.
Justice Thomas, joined on this point by Chief Justice Rehnquist as
well as Justice Scalia, would also grant qualified immunity to Groh .8
Thomas attacks the qualified immunity holding because he feels the
"clearly established" rule it turns upon was defined at too high a level
of generality.8 9 In Anderson v. Creighton the Court ruled that the rea-
sonable officer must understand that "what he is doing violates th [e]
right" for immunity to be denied.90 The majority's rejoinder points to
the ATF's own directive, which warns agents that a search warrant
must be "sufficient on its face even when issued by a magistrate. "
Thus, not only did Groh know of the language of the Fourth
Amendment, but also an ATF order pointed out to him the need to
check warrants. Then Justice Thomas makes an argument similar to
Justice Kennedy's that Groh simply did not realize there was an error
in the warrant when he executed the search and his "failure to notice
the defect" was reasonable.92 The same reply that violating a constitu-
tional requirement makes a warrant so facially deficient that no rea-
sonable officer can presume it valid is in order.
93
This case may be sui generis when compared to other qualified
immunity cases. Most other qualified immunity cases deal with an of-
ficer's mistaken understanding of a constitutional principle that is
87 See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining justice Kennedy's example).
88 Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1298, 1301-03 (Thomas,J, dissenting).
89 Id. at 1301-02 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)).
90 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
91 Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1294 (majority opinion) (citing ATF Order 0 3220.1(7)(d) (Feb. 13,
1997)). The order points out potential liability and reads: "Special agents are liable if they ex-
ceed their authority while executing a search warrant and must be sure that a search warrant is
sufficient on its face even when issued by a magistrate." Id. (citing ATF Order 0 3220.1 (7) (d)
(Feb. 13, 1997)).
92 Id. at 1302-03 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
93 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) ("Depending on the circumstances of
the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient ... that the executing officers cannot
reasonably presume it to be valid."). One Groh dissenter wonders why this is one of those cases
and the good-faith exception should not apply. See Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1302 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (pointing out that the Court does not explain why the exception does not apply). Again,
the violation of a constitutional requirement, which the Thomas dissent does not find, makes
this one of those cases. The other Groh dissenter feels that the reliance on Leon is misplaced
since this case is not about relying on the deficient warrant, but rather not knowing it was defi-
cient. See id. at 1297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). However, missing such a clear violation of the
Fourth Amendment caused the agents to rely on a deficient warrant.
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vague and open to debate.94 Comparatively, this case dealt with an of-
ficer who likely knew the rule, but did not realize he was violating it.
Agent Groh could not claim he did not understand the contours of
the particularity rule since it is so plainly explained in the Constitu-
tion itse lf95 and his own department's orders further emphasize the
rule.96 Therefore, this case may stand as an outlier and the holding
be narrowed to its facts, thereby leaving the mistake justification in-
tact for mistakes about more ambiguous legal provisions.
IV
Understanding Groh's impact means understanding its potential as
well as its limits. For Fourth Amendment purposes, it is an important
decision because it solidifies the warrant requirement and further
outlines what is required for its satisfaction. While the Court leaves
open the door to the general rule that officers need to show warrants
upon request, it does not reach the issue and even points out consti-
tutional conceptual hurdles in recognizing such a proposition.
97
Similarly, Groh is significant for qualified immunity purposes because
it narrows the mistake justification for clear violations of the Constitu-
tion to almost zero tolerance. Even though there is no suggestion of
bad faith on behalf of Agent Groh, he will likely now be found liable
for his drafting of the warrant. Nevertheless, the Court was willing to
withhold immunity from Groh because a violation of clear constitu-
tional language cannot be reasonable. However, it must be remem-
bered that the particularity requirement is one of the few clear and
precise clauses of the Constitution-most others use vague terms
such as "cruel and unusual punishment[]"9 8 or "probable cause"9 that
are open to debate over their meaning.00 Therefore, this opinion
94 See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (cruel and unusual punishment); Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (excessive force); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (prob-
able cause); see a/soJason P. Rubin, Comment, A Constitutional Education: Use of the Enforcement
Clause to Limit the Unfortunate Effect of the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 163
(2003) (arguing for congressional legislation mandating constitutional education for officers to
raise the standard of the "reasonable officer" in cases involving qualified immunity determina-
tions that deal with more ambiguous clauses). Such a heightened education is not needed in
this case as the violation is of the constitutional language itself, but may be useful in other quali-
fied immunity cases.
95 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
96 See supra note 91 (referencing the ATF orders relied upon in Groh).
97 See Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1292 n.5 (majority opinion) (pointing out that showing the warrant
before a search is not required by the Fourth Amendment while leaving open the question of
the reasonableness of a search that denies a request to see the search warrant).
98 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Io See generally Rubin, supra note 94 (proposing a way to elevate the reasonable officer stan-
dard in these more ambiguous cases).
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may have little impact on other qualified immunity cases. The debate
about the importance of the particularity requirement and the nar-
rowing of qualified immunity for honest, but constitutionally flagrant,
mistakes will continue on in the law journals and courts. It can be
certain that these old debates will continue for some time to come.
-Matthew S. Tripolitsiotis"
J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Pennsylvania Law School; M.G.A., Fels Center of
Government, University of Pennsylvania; B.A., Villanova University. Special thanks are owed to
David Rudovsky for his helpful comments on previous drafts of this piece.
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